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Abstract 
Empirical studies of innovation have found that end users frequently 
develop important product and process innovations. Defying conventional 
wisdom on the negative effects of uncompensated spillovers, innovative 
users also often openly reveal their innovations to competing users and to 
manufacturers. Rival users are thus in a position to reproduce the innovation 
in-house and benefit from using it, and manufacturers are in a position to 
refine the innovation and sell it to all users, including competitors of the 
user revealing its innovation. In this paper we explore the incentives that 
users might have to freely reveal their proprietary innovations. We then 
develop a game-theoretic model to explore the effect of these incentives on 
users’ decisions to reveal or hide their proprietary information. We find that, 
under realistic parameter constellations, free revealing pays. We conclude 
by discussing some implications of our findings. 
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1 Introduction 
A large body of research has shown that users of products and processes are the 
developers of many important innovations that are later produced and sold by 
manufacturers (e.g., Enos 1962, Knight 1963, Freeman 1968, Shaw 1985, von Hippel 
1988). The analysis of these innovation processes has also often shown a puzzling 
phenomenon: Innovating users often do not sell or license their innovations to 
manufacturers. Instead, they freely reveal details of their innovations to other users and 
to manufacturers (von Hippel and Finkelstein 1979, Allen 1983, Morrison et al. 2000, 
Lim, 2000, Lakhani and von Hippel 2000). Free revealing is also a central feature of 
“open source” software development projects. Contributors to such projects freely 
reveal the novel software code they have developed to fellow innovators and to free 
riders on equal terms (e.g., Raymond 1999, Lerner and Tirole 2002). 
When we say that an innovator “freely reveals” proprietary information, we mean 
that all existing and potential intellectual property rights to that information are 
voluntarily given up by that innovator and all interested parties are given access to it – 
the information becomes a public good. Thus, we define the free revealing of 
information by a possessor as the granting of access to all interested agents without 
imposition of any direct payment. For example, placement of non-patented information 
in a publicly-accessible site such as a journal or public website would be free revealing 
as we define it. 
Free revealing, as so defined, does not mean that recipients necessarily acquire 
and utilize the revealed information at no cost to themselves. Recipients may, for 
example, have to pay for a journal subscription or an internet connection or a field trip 
to acquire the information being freely revealed. Also, some may have to obtain 
complementary information or other assets in order to fully understand that information 
or put it to use. However, if the information possessor does not profit directly from any 
such expenditures made by information adopters, the information itself is still freely 
revealed, according to our definition. 
Conversely, note that innovators may sometimes choose to subsidize the 
acquisition, evaluation and use of their freely-revealed information by others. For 
example, a firm may invest in extensive and expensive lobbying to get others to adopt a 
technical standard it has developed. Similarly, writers of computer code that they freely 
reveal may work hard to document their code in a way that is very easy for potential 
adopters to understand. Such subsidization efforts may make the adoption of 
information more likely; but as long as the information itself satisfies our above 
definition, we consider it being freely revealed. 
To economists, free revealing is surprising, because it violates a central tenant of 
the economic theory of innovation. In this classical view, appropriating returns to 
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innovation requires agents to keep the knowledge underlying an innovation secret or to 
protect it by patents (or other means). After all, non-compensated spillovers of 
innovation-related information should represent a loss that innovators would seek to 
avoid if at all possible, even at some cost. Why then do we observe that some 
innovation-related information is revealed freely? 
In this paper we explore this question by first describing incentives which might 
induce user-innovators to freely reveal their innovations. We summarize explanations 
that have been proposed in the literature and we add some of our own ideas as well. 
Next, we link these incentives to qualitative evidence regarding the free-revealing of 
innovations by users in a number of fields (section 2). Then we use a game-theoretic 
model to explore the effect of the incentives and derive conditions under which it might 
pay users to freely reveal their innovations to other users and/or to manufacturers. We 
conclude that, under very plausible parameter constellations, it does indeed pay users to 
freely reveal their innovations to other users – even to direct rivals (section 3). Finally, 
we discuss the implications of free revealing of innovations, suggesting that it is a 
crucial element in an emergent innovation process characterized by a distribution of 
innovation-related activities between users and manufacturers. We also discuss possible 
extensions of our work in the final section of the paper (section 4). 
2 Incentives and qualitative evidence for free revealing 
2.1 Review of the literature 
The specific context in which we explore free revealing involves users that have 
developed an innovation for in-house use. In principle, such users have a choice among 
three options: they may keep the innovation secret in order to exploit it in-house; they 
may license it; or they may choose to freely reveal it. In this paper we contrast the costs 
and benefits of only two choices, i.e., of secrecy versus free revealing. We do this 
because a number of empirical studies conducted by several authors over a span of 
many years have found that licensing is often not a particularly effective means for 
capturing royalty income. The very few exceptions to this rule typically found are in the 
fields of pharmaceuticals, chemicals and chemical processes. 
The available literature clearly suggests that licensing income is typically minute 
in comparison to the operative income that innovating companies earn. Literature on 
returns from licensing patents includes a study by Taylor and Silberston (1973). They 
examined the impact of British and foreign patents in a very rich study of 44 British and 
multinational firms selected from five broad “classes” of industrial activity. They found 
that these firms gained relatively little from licensing, when benefits were computed as 
licensing fees and/or other considerations received minus patenting and licensing costs 
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incurred by the innovating firm. Wilson (1975) studied data on royalty payments 
submitted by some U.S. corporations to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
in 1971 on Form 10K. He too, found corporate returns from licensing to be generally 
low. Hill (1992) comes to a similarly sceptical assessment of licensing, based on a 
theoretical analysis.1 
The low returns from licensing patented knowledge found by Taylor and 
Silberston and by Wilson could be caused by two separate reasons: first, licensing relies 
on intellectual property rights such as patents, and the protection afforded by these 
rights may be weak which in turn weakens licensing as an appropriation mechanism; 
second, the owners of intellectual property may have little incentive to license it because 
the mechanism is too complex and involves high transaction costs. Our survey of the 
literature shows that both of these theoretical causes are likely to be present in a large 
number of industries. 
We first consider the value of patent rights. It is well-known by now that many 
patents are not particularly valuable, since the overall distribution of patent values is 
highly skewed.2 The results from various survey also indicate that patent protection is 
typically not very effective. An early study by Scherer (1959) found only eight of thirty 
seven respondents (“executives responsible for technical change”) reporting that patents 
were “very important” to their companies. Fourteen reported that patents had “some 
importance”, and fifteen said they were “not very important” to their firms (Scherer 
1959, 117). This result is especially interesting because Scherer selected his sample only 
from the firms which presumably value patents most highly – those which hold a large 
number of them. A similar finding was reported by Taylor and Silberston (1973). They 
report that 24 of the 32 responding firms said that 5 percent or less of recent R&D 
expenditures would not have been undertaken if patent protection had not been available 
(Taylor and Silberston 1973, 30). Levin et al. (1987), in a survey of 650 R&D 
executives in 130 different industries found that all except respondents from the 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries judged patents to be “relatively ineffective”. In 
more recent studies, similar findings are reported by Mansfield (1985, 1986), Harabi 
(1995), and Cohen et al. (2000). 
                                                 
1  Of course, there are notable exceptions. Baumol (2002, p. 84) lists a number of examples where 
licensing is profitable and does indeed play a major role. 
2  See Harhoff, Scherer and Vopel (2003) for a detailed assessment the value distribution of patents in 
Germany. They find that a very small share of patents (about 10 per cent) from a particular priority 
year account for about 90 percent of the total value of this portfolio. Hence, while there are a few 
valuable patents, most innovators are likely to view patents as not particularly valuable. 
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Secondly, we note that – even if patents are valuable to patent-holders – the 
licensing of their intellectual property may entail significant costs. The theoretical 
licensing literature has long acknowledged that the context of technology transfer is 
beset with informational problems leading to the potential of moral hazard and adverse 
selection.3 Licensing contracts are typically complex and hard to monitor. Cost 
considerations may therefore an impediment to licensing even in those cases when the 
underlying intellectual property rights are strong.4 Given that licensing is seldom a 
practical option, innovating users are typically left with a choice between two 
alternatives: should they freely reveal their innovation to a manufacturer and all others – 
including competing users - or should they (try to) keep it secret while profiting from 
in-house use? 
Interestingly, the ability to keep intellectual property secret is not a general nor 
necessarily a long-term possibility.  Much intellectual property cannot be kept a secret 
because, as in the case of products placed into the open market, it must be revealed in 
order to be sold.  It is true that user-innovators are in a position to benefit from their 
process innovations while keeping them secret behind their factory walls. All innovators 
are also in principle able to keep their innovations secret while developing them and 
before putting them on the market. Even within these categories, however, Mansfield 
(1985) has found that the period during which intellectual property can be kept secret is 
quite limited. He studied a sample of 100 American firms and found that 
“…information concerning development decisions is generally in the hands of rivals 
within about 12 to 18 months, on the average, and information concerning the detailed 
nature and operation of a new product or process generally leaks out within about a 
year.”  This suggests that the true choice facing most user-innovators is the choice 
between secrecy or selective or free revealing for a period of about a year, and only 
between voluntary or involuntary free revealing in the longer run. 
To our knowledge, the literature on what we are calling free revealing as an 
economically-rational behavior among profit-seeking firms begins with Allen (1983).  
Allen described a phenomenon he calls “collective invention” that he observed in 
archival materials related to the nineteenth-century English iron industry. Two 
important attributes of iron furnaces used by that industry were subject to steady 
                                                 
3  For detailed considerations of the costs of technology transfer, see Teece (1977) and Baumol (1993, 
ch. 9 and 10). 
4  For licensing to occur, both the licensee and the licensor have to profit. In the presence of asymmetric 
information, the incentives for licensing can quickly deteriorate. As Firestone (1971) notes, most 
patents held by corporations are never licensed. Patents held by independent inventors are rarely 
licensed to more than one firm. The impact of asymmetric information on licensing is considered in 
detail by Gallini and Wright (1990). 
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improvement during 1850-1875 in England’s Cleveland district: an increase in the 
height of the furnace, and an increase in the temperature of the “blast” air pumped into 
an iron furnace during operation. Both types of technical change resulted in a significant 
and progressive improvement in the energy efficiency of iron production. Allen found 
that in the technical writings of the time, at least some innovators publicly revealed data 
on their furnace design and performance in meetings of professional societies and in 
published material.   
Allen suggested three reasons that might provide an economic rationalization for 
this pattern of behavior by profit-seeking firms.  First, he proposed that reputation 
gained for the firm or firm managers might offset a reduction in profits for the firm 
caused by free revealing.  Second, he reasoned that so many people might know the 
information that it “…would have been costly to keep it secret.  In the case of blast 
furnaces and steelworks, the construction would have been done by contractors who 
would know the design.  The designs themselves were often created by consulting 
engineers who shifted from firm to firm (Allen p.17).” Third, he proposed that the 
behavior might have effects that actually increase firm profits. This may be so because 
the revealed innovation is to some degree specific to assets owned by the innovator (see 
also Hirschleifer 1971) or to certain features of his production process (which may be 
shared by some other firms, in particular those in the same region, but not by the whole 
industry). Revealing may also increase the innovator’s profit by enlarging the overall 
market for the product under consideration.  
De Fraja (1996) demonstrates that two firms engaged in a patent race may 
disclose information voluntarily if the payoff structure does not allocate the prize 
exclusively to the winner. In this case, being second quickly may be preferable to being 
first relatively late; hence, firms allow for voluntary spillovers in order to accelerate the 
arrival date of the invention. Mishina (1989) studied free revealing in the lithographic 
equipment industry. He shows that firms may sometimes prefer to reveal their 
innovation to suppliers even if doing so entails a loss of comparative advantage. This 
loss may be dominated by increases in productivity coming from cost reductions 
triggered by the new equipment.  To illustrate this source of incentive, consider that, by 
freely revealing information regarding an innovative product or process, a user makes it 
possible for manufacturers to learn about that innovation, to improve upon it and also 
possibly to offer it at a lower price than the cost incurred by users seeking to produce it 
on a smaller scale in-house. When the improved version is offered for sale to the general 
market, the original user-innovator (and other users as well) is able to acquire it and 
gain from in-house use of the improvements. For example, consider that manufacturers 
often convert user-developed innovations (“home-builts”) into a much more robust and 
reliable form when preparing them for sale on the commercial market. Also, 
manufacturers offer related services, such as field maintenance and repair programs, 
that innovating users must otherwise provide for themselves. 
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A number of researchers have explored the incentives that might induce open 
source software developers to freely reveal the source code they have produced. One 
incentive that has been proposed as relevant in this context is the reputational incentive 
that was posited with respect to collective invention by Allen. The basic argument here 
is that free revealing of quality code can increase a programmer’s reputation with peers 
(Raymond 1999) as well as his or her value on the job market (Lerner and Tirole 2002). 
Other arguments focus on the likely low level of damage to the innovator associated 
with a decision to freely reveal. First, with regard to the cost disadvantage incurred by 
innovators relative to free riders, consider that those who do contribute code to open 
source projects report that they both enjoyed and learned from the work of coding – thus 
the actual cost of generating that code may be even seen as negative by the writer 
(Lakhani and Wolf 2002). Second, with respect to the potential avoidability of losses 
associated with free revealing, consider that code-writers may often feel that others have 
developed code similar to their own and are likely to freely reveal it if they don’t  – 
which would render any decision that they might make to hide their code moot (Lakhani 
and von Hippel 2000). Finally, a number of writers have proposed that communal 
norms, including altruism, may play a strong role in inducing free revealing in the field 
of open source software. For example, programmers may feel incented by “generalized 
reciprocity” (Eckh 1974) to reveal their code because they have benefited from the code 
freely revealed by others (e.g., Raymond 1999). 
We propose an additional class of incentives for free revealing that are 
consequences of increased diffusion. When an innovating user freely reveals an 
innovation, the direct result is to increase the diffusion of that innovation relative to 
what it would be if the innovation were either licensed at a fee or held secret. The 
innovating user may then benefit from the increase in diffusion via a number of effects.  
Among these are network effects, reputational gains, and related innovations induced 
among and revealed by other users.  In addition, and very importantly, an innovation 
that is freely revealed and adopted by others can become an informal standard that may 
preempt the development and/or commercialization of other versions of the innovation.  
If, as was suggested by Allen, the innovation that is revealed is designed in a way that is 
especially appropriate to conditions unique to the innovator, this can result in creating a 
permanent source of advantage for that innovator.  Note that being first to reveal a given 
type of innovation increases a user’s chances of having his innovation widely adopted, 
other things being equal.  This may induce innovators to race to reveal first. 
Negative effects from free revealing are associated with any advantage this action 
provides to free-riding competitors relative to the innovator.  The stronger the 
competition between the user-innovator and other users of the innovation, the larger will 
be the loss of competitive advantage that the innovator incurs by revealing.  When 
competition between innovation users is low, e.g. due to geographical separation of 
markets, the revealing user does not suffer as a consequence of the advantages he 
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provides to others.  As was noted above, this loss is moderated by the degree to which 
the innovation suits other users’ needs: the more specific it is to the innovating user, the 
smaller the effect of competitors’ using it.  
2.2 Qualitative evidence for free revealing 
2.2.1 Equipment to produce “copper-interconnect” semiconductors 
IBM was first to develop a process to manufacture semiconductors that 
incorporated copper interconnections among circuit elements instead of the 
traditionally-used aluminum ones. This innovation provided a major improvement to 
semiconductor performance, and on the face of it, it would have paid IBM to not reveal 
its process to others. After a delay IBM did, however, “freely reveal” increasing 
amounts of proprietary process information to rival users and to equipment suppliers. 
IBM freely revealed information about its innovation because it needed equipment 
to implement the process on a production scale. Detailed design and production of such 
equipment required the combining of information held by semiconductor equipment 
suppliers and IBM. Since development of novel process equipment is a very expensive 
matter in the semiconductor field, suppliers would only be willing to build equipment 
that could potentially be sold to the entire market. Revealing innovation-related 
information selectively so as to insure that the IBM process approach became the 
industry standard – but that IBM still maintained a lead in the marketplace – was 
therefore in IBM’s best interest. Thus, IBM was motivated to “openly reveal” its 
innovation by the incentive of inducing manufacturer improvements and of setting a 
standard advantageous to the innovator user (Lim 2000, Harhoff 19965). 
2.2.2 Improvements to clinical chemistry analyzer equipment and tests 
The Technicon Corporation was the first to produce automated clinical chemistry 
analyzers – a type of medical equipment used to determine the levels of chemical 
                                                 
5   Lim (2000) describes IBM’s motivation as follows:  “IBM is also attempting to capture indirect 
benefits.  According to my interviews, several IBM employees realized in the mid-1990s that it 
would benefit from lower equipment costs if the rest of the industry also adopted copper technology.  
This is consistent with the strategic sharing of information (Harhoff 1996).  In line with this, IBM 
formed the alliance with Novellus and later relaxed somewhat on its secrecy.  Although it continues 
to guard sensitive process information, it has begun to share its copper technology with other 
companies, including Siemens (Infineon), Sanyo, and a startup foundry in Taiwan (Table 8a).  
However, it is important to point out that this strategy of sharing technology was only feasible after 
IBM had established itself as the leader. Otherwise, another firm might have exploited the knowledge 
to beat it to market.” See Lim (2000) for a detailed discussion. 
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constituents of blood.  The basic design of their product was taken from a system that 
had been earlier developed and used by laboratory clinicians – users of that type of 
equipment.  This user-developed design was modular and well-suited to low-cost 
modification by other users who had an incentive to do this. After commercial 
introduction of the basic analyzer, many users developed test and hardware innovations 
and freely revealed these via publication and other means. Other users and the 
Technicon company then adopted many of these innovations (20+ in the case of the 
Technicon company itself) without payment to the innovators. Open revealing of 
innovations by users was encouraged by Technicon via a firm-supported research 
publication and via a research seminar series sponsored by the company (von Hippel 
and Finkelstein 1979). 
Open revealing of innovations by users in this field served the purpose of 
inducing manufacturer improvements. Innovating users in this instance were typically 
employees in the clinical labs of publicly-supported institutions.  They were scientist-
rivals rather than commercial rivals with respect to other users.  Their ongoing research 
benefited when Technicon adopted and improved their innovations. They also gained 
reputation-related benefits from peers and employers when they established their 
priority with respect to their innovations. 
2.2.3 Improvements to computerized library information systems  
Library “OPACs“ (Online Public Access) are computerized information systems 
that give patrons access to library collections (they functionally replace the traditional 
“card catalog“ form of collection index) and to the rich information resources of the 
Internet.  The first OPACs were developed by leading-edge users in the early 1970’s.  In 
the late 1970’s, suppliers began to offer OPACs as commercial products.  Prior to the 
late 1990’s OPACs were not designed to make modification by users easy.  
Nonetheless, a study of Australian libraries using OPACs showed that 26% had 
modified the code of the OPAC they had purchased (or developed themselves) to 
improve its functionality.  The study also showed that innovating users freely revealed 
their innovations to other users and to their OPAC suppliers in manufacturer-sponsored 
“user’s group” meetings and elsewhere. Manufacturers were willing to adopt user-
requested or user-prototyped improvements in OPAC functionality – without any 
payment to user-innovators - if “enough” users wanted the same thing. So one or more 
users would sometimes engage in pre-meeting lobbying to generate widespread support 
for an innovation they wished to have adopted and supported by their OPAC supplier. 
Innovating users in the library field were not rivals in the marketplace – each served a 
geographically or topically distinct group of patrons. They benefited from openly 
revealing their innovations by inducing manufacturer improvements (Morrison et al. 
2000). 
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2.2.4 Development of open-source software 
Open-source software products, such as Linux operating system software and 
Apache computer server software, are built up from modules and “patches” developed 
by programmer-users of that software. Open source software has its roots in the “free 
software” movement started by Richard Stallman in the early 1980s.  Stallman founded 
the Free Software Foundation (FSF) as a means to counter the trend towards proprietary 
development of software packages, and the release of software without the underlying 
source code.6  Stallman’s pioneering idea was that software authors interested in 
preserving the status of their software as “free” software could use their own copyright 
to grant licenses on terms that would guarantee a number of rights to all future users.  
They could do this by simply affixing a standard license to their software that conveyed 
these rights.  The basic license developed by Stallman to implement this idea was the 
General Public License or GPL (sometimes referred to as “copyleft” - a play on the 
word “copyright”).  Basic rights transferred to those possessing a copy of free software 
include the right to use it at no cost, the right to study its “source code,” to modify it, 
and to distribute modified or unmodified versions to others at no cost.7   
The philosophy of the FSF movement has been recently extended by a number of 
individuals promoting the “Open Source” concept.  These individuals have been less 
concerned about the freeness of “free software” and have instead been interested in 
encouraging software companies to release source code for their products under the 
GPL or licenses conveying similar rights.  
Contributors of open source code to an open source project freely reveal their 
developments to all other users and also to the volunteer individual or user organization 
that manages that open source software product.  This individual or organization is 
                                                 
6  Source code is a sequence of instructions to be executed by a computer to accomplish a program’s 
purpose.  Programmers write computer software in the form of source code, and also “document” that 
source code with brief written explanations of the purpose and design of each section of their 
program.  To convert a program into a form that can actually operate a computer, source code is 
translated into machine code using a software tool called a compiler.  The compiling process removes 
program documentation and creates a “binary” version of the program -  a sequence of computer 
instructions consisting only of strings of ones and zeros.  Binary code is very difficult for 
programmers to read and interpret.  Therefore, programmers or firms that wish to prevent others from 
understanding and modifying their code will release only binary versions of the software.  In contrast, 
programmers or firms that wish to enable others to understand and update and modify their software 
will provide them with its source code. 
7  Note that this is not full “free revealing”  as defined in section 1, since others’ rights to use the 
software are restricted in some respects.  Specifically, users of open source software protected under 
a GPL license may not incorporate that software into commercial, closed-source software.  However, 
the rights granted to other users are so far-reaching that we judge that we may consider open source 
software as being freely revealed for the purposes of our analyses in this paper. 
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responsible for approving software code and generally distributes improvements 
adopted as “official” by posting revised software code on the Internet. Innovating users 
receive no direct payment from freely revealing their innovations in this manner. 
Students of the open source software development process report that innovating 
users have a number of motives for freely revealing their code to open source project 
managers and open source code users in general.  If they freely reveal, others can debug 
and improve upon the modules they have contributed, to everyone’s benefit.  They are 
also motivated to have their improvement incorporated into the standard version of the 
open-source software that is generally distributed by the volunteer open source user 
organization, because it will then be updated and maintained without further effort on 
the innovator’s part. This volunteer organization is the functional equivalent of a 
manufacturer with respect to inducing manufacturer improvements, because a user-
developed improvement will only be assured of inclusion in new “official” software 
releases if it is approved and adopted by the coordinating user group. Innovating users 
also report being motivated to freely reveal their code under a free or open source 
license by a number of additional factors. These include giving support to open code, 
“giving back” to those whose freely-revealed code has been of value to them and 
gaining a personal reputational advantage by having a contribution accepted into the 
official version of an open source program (Lakhani and Wolf 2001). 
3 A model of the relative benefits of secrecy and free revealing 
It will be useful to explore the conditions under which secrecy or free revealing 
would be the most profitable course of action for users that have developed an 
innovation. We develop a model that allows us to systematically assess the likely 
profitability of users’ decisions to voluntarily reveal or hide information about their 
proprietary innovations. Our model incorporates four important variables related to this 
decision: (1) the intensity of competition among users (model parameter α); (2) the 
degree to which the innovation has a bias favoring the innovating user (parameter γ)8; 
(3) the value to the innovating user of the improvements that free revealing induces the 
manufacturer of the innovation to make and distribute to all users equally (parameter µ); 
and (4) the cost to each user of adopting the improved commercial product (parameter 
c).  
                                                 
8  Innovations developed by users will typically, intentionally or unintentionally, contain imbedded 
characteristics particularly beneficial to that user. Manufacturers may wish to strip these out in order 
to make the innovation more general.  However, it is frequently the case that manufacturers cannot 
identify all user-specific features embedded in a product or service, because the innovating user 
typically has a much deeper understanding of the innovation’s intended use and use context.  
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In order to make our model more concise and also conservative with respect to the 
value of free revealing, we do not include the effect of two incentives mentioned in our 
literature review as likely to contribute to the profitability of freely revealing 
innovation-related information.  These are: (1) the impact of community expectations 
favoring free revealing such as generalized reciprocity; and (2) any increase in the value 
of assets complementary to the innovation held by the firm – assets ranging from 
physical assets to reputational assets.  For simplicity, we also do not consider any costs 
an innovator may incur to either maintain secrecy or increase the diffusion of freely-
revealed information.   
We also do not incorporate a number of related issues that may be of interest for 
further study. For example, we do not model explicitly how the heterogeneity among 
product users emerges, i.e., why some of them are endowed with innovations in our 
model and others are not. For our purposes here, it is immaterial whether innovative 
users have reached their position by chance or, for example, by a special ability to 
develop an innovative product or process.  We also do not model explicitly why 
transactions are not accompanied by monetary compensation – for example, why the 
revelation of an innovation is not subject to a licensing contract. We do this because, as 
was mentioned earlier, empirical evidence clearly indicates that this behavior is rare, 
and that the practical choice offered to user-innovators is the choice between enjoying 
some period of exclusivity via secrecy and the voluntary free revealing of their 
innovations without monetary compensation. 
3.1 Model structure 
We consider the case of two user firms each of which may have developed an 
innovation. We will assume that these user firms are identical with respect to all other 
aspects that bear on their profitability. The innovating firm(s) can profit from the 
innovation by keeping it secret (Mansfield 1985, Levin et al. 1987) or by revealing it to 
a manufacturer firm which will decide whether to improve the product and offer it to 
both users. Revealing the innovation to the manufacturer also entails making it known 
to the world at large. We make the conservative assumption that it is not possible to 
reveal the innovation exclusively to the manufacturer. One reason for this is that the 
manufacturer may be able to assess the profitability of incorporating the innovation into 
his product only after the market has had a chance to get to know it. The users may then 
decide to adopt or not to adopt the improved innovation. These decisions are modeled in 
a sequential-move game. 
The basic parameters of the game are four. First, the extent of competition 
(denoted by α) between the user firms relates increases in the payoff of one firm to 
losses for the other one. The higher the payoff of firm 1, the lower will be the payoff of 
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firm 2 if competition is intense. Conversely, if competition is low (due to largely 
separate markets, e.g.) then the impact of firms’ payoffs on each other will be small.  
Second, we allow for different technologies employed by the two user firms. 
While standard oligopoly models typically assume that firms are identical with respect 
to their production technology, we find this assumption quite restrictive and in many 
cases unrealistic. The usual logic would suggest that firms will adopt the lowest-cost 
technology and that in the long run, only firms with that technology will be present in 
the market. In reality, the choice of production technology is likely to be path-
dependent. Due to sunk cost investments, firms will not adjust their production 
technology immediately, and even over longer periods of time we are likely to observe 
pronounced differences in production technology. The most important implication of 
heterogeneity of this kind is that the value of innovations may differ across firms. In 
particular, if firm 1 develops an innovation, it is likely to be tailored to its own 
production technology. Transferred to a different production environment, the beneficial 
effect of the innovation (e.g. its contribution to cost reduction) may be substantially 
lower than in the innovator’s context. We capture the idiosyncratic nature of the 
innovation in a separate parameter γ (“generality”) which ranges between 0 (the 
technology is completely specific and cannot usefully be employed by any other firm) 
and 1 (the technology is completely general and yields identical benefits to all firms). 
The third parameter µ describes the extent to which the manufacturer can improve 
the innovation or reduce its price, e.g. by virtue of large-scale production. To the 
innovator, the value of the improved innovation is by a factor of (1+µ) larger than that 
of the “homebuilt” version. Naturally, in an extended model this would again be 
considered an endogenous variable, but for the time being we consider it as exogenously 
given.  
Finally, when the manufacturer sells the improved innovation, adoption is 
associated with some costs c which reflect either switching costs or the price that the 
manufacturer demands for the improved product. We do not model the pricing decision; 
but we assume that the manufacturer will not be able to extract all the surplus from the 
transaction. 
3.2 Case 1: Innovation by one user 
Consider the case of user 1 having developed an innovation and user 2 not having 
done so – the game tree and payoffs for this situation are depicted in Figure 1.  
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Include Figure 1 about here  
The undisclosed innovation yields an increment δ in present discounted profits to 
the innovator. But user 1’s gain also has a competitive effect for user 2. We note the 
strength of competition by α and specify the impact of the innovation on the other 
user’s profit as –αδ, where 0≤α≤1. In a fully developed oligopoly model, α would be a 
function of technical and economic determinants.9 Note that a more dramatic 
improvement of the innovator's position is likely to hurt its competitors more than a 
marginal improvement would. 
In stage 1, the innovative user 1 may decide to reveal the innovation to a 
manufacturer of the improved good. We assume that this revelation automatically 
triggers a complete spillover to the second user. Revealing may have the advantage that 
the manufacturer may have specific expertise in improving the product further which 
the innovator may lack. Moreover, the manufacturer may be able to produce the product 
at lower cost than the innovator himself would incur to reproduce it. But revealing has 
two disadvantages: i) the revealed information becomes available to all other agents, 
and ii) the manufacturer will offer improved or lower-cost versions of the innovation to 
all users on an equal basis.  
At stage 2, the manufacturer decides whether to incorporate the innovation in his 
product and whether to spend effort on improvements. We assume that the manufacturer 
will do so only if the improved innovation can be sold to both users.10 Once the 
                                                 
9  A commonly used approach models the demand that firm 1 faces as  
,1),,( 21211 appappD +−=  
 where p1 and p2 denote the prices of firms 1 and 2, resp., and a parameterizes the degree of 
competition. Ignoring fixed cost for simplicity, the profit of firm 1 obtains as  
),1)((),,,( 21111211 appcpacpp +−−=Π  
 with ci denoting the variable cost per unit of firm i. A calculation of Nash equilibrium strategies and 
profits shows that the variation of profits Π1 and Π2 with e.g. c1 can be reasonably well 
approximated, in the relevant parameter range, by a linear function. Obviously, with a decrease in c1 
– due to an innovation by firm 1, say – Π1 increases, while Π2 decreases. Because of the near-
linearity of the profit functions, this profit reduction for firm 2 is approximately proportional to the 
gain for firm 1. It is more pronounced the stronger competition is, i.e., the higher the competition 
parameter a. This shows that the payoffs we used can qualitatively also be deduced from a 
microeconomic model. The big advantage of our approach lies in the much simpler mathematical 
expressions. 
10  More formally, but with the same effect, we could assume that the fixed costs of manufacturer R&D 
will only be covered if the manufacturer can sell the innovation to both users. 
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improved innovation is adopted, its effect on user 1’s profit is given by ∆=(1+µ)δ with 
µ≥0.  
The second user firm may also profit from the innovation, but to a lesser extent 
than the innovator. This effect is due to the fact that the innovator will have tailored the 
innovation optimally to its own production environment. This specificity – we assume – 
cannot be unraveled by the manufacturer. Hence, the other user will only enjoy a 
marginal direct payoff of γ∆  with 0≤γ≤1 from adopting the manufacturer-improved 
innovation (and, correspondingly, γδ from adopting the innovator’s “homebuilt” 
version). The case of γ=1 denotes one of complete generality of the innovation, while 
γ=0 denotes the polar case of complete specificity.  
The impact of competition enters the payoffs again by subtraction of the other 
user's payoff times the competition parameter α. Hence, once the innovation has been 
revealed by the innovator, and once it has been adopted by his competitor, the 
innovator's payoff is given by ∆−αγ∆−c while the other firm enjoys a payoff of 
γ∆−α∆−c, where c is the respective user’s cost of adoption. 
User 2 adopts if  
 γ∆ - α∆ - c  >  γδ - α∆      ⇔      γµ  >  c/δ  . (1) 
Note that user 1 always adopts the improved innovation if user 2 does so (for user 
1, the condition corresponding to (1) reads µ>c/δ, which is, since γ≤1, fulfilled 
whenever (1) is). Hence, from the manufacturer’s point of view, it is only user 2’s 
decision that is of interest. 
In Figure 2, which shows the parameter space (α,γ), this condition means that the 
parameter constellation (α,γ) must lie above the straight horizontal line. Given that user 
2 would adopt a manufacturer-improved innovation, user 1 finds it profitable to reveal 
his innovation if 
 ∆ - αγ∆ - c   >   δ      ⇔      γ   <   (µ-c/δ) / (α(µ+1))  . (2)  
In the six panels in Figure 2, this condition is fulfilled in the area below the 
downward-sloping curve. Taking conditions (1) and (2) together yields the condition 
that the parameters (α,γ) must lie in the shaded area.  
Include Figure 2 about here 
In Figure 2, we depict these conditions for six different parameter combinations. 
The upper three scenarios assume that µ=1, i.e., the manufacturer-improved innovation 
has twice the value to the innovator than the self-developed one. In the lower three 
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panels, we assume that µ=2. In the left-hand panels, the cost of adoption are relatively 
small relative to the innovation’s value (c/δ =1/4). The middle and right-hand scenarios 
then display the free-revealing conditions for relative adoption cost levels of c/ δ =1/2 
and c/δ=3/4, respectively. The changes in µ and in c/δ affect both curves 
simultaneously. Higher adoption costs make adoption by user 2 less likely, and they 
also reduce the benefit from free revealing to the innovator. Similarly, an increase in the 
degree of improvement µ by the manufacturer induces greater willingness to adopt (user 
2) and to reveal (user 1). Note that greater competition will tend to reduce the likelihood 
of free-revealing through its impact on the expected benefit for the innovator. 
3.3 Case 2: Innovation by both users 
If both users have innovated, then either none, one, or both of them may reveal 
their innovation to the manufacturer. Since such a revelation is observable by the 
competitor only with a considerable delay, we model the users’ decisions to reveal as a 
simultaneous one.  
Given that at least one innovator has revealed his innovation, the manufacturer has 
to decide if to incorporate it into his product or not. If he does, then in the following 
stage both users are facing the decision to adopt the improved product or not. Figure 3 
shows the payoff matrices for the case that only one user has revealed (left-hand panel - 
we depict the case that this is user 1) and for the case that both have revealed (right-
hand panel). 
Include Figure 3 about here 
We assume that a user-innovator who does not adopt a manufacturer-improved 
product exclusively benefits from his own innovation (δ), not from his competitor’s 
revealed innovation. The latter might yield him a benefit of γδ, but as we consider the 
two users’ innovations as close substitutes, there is no point in adopting the other’s 
innovation on top (and certainly not instead) of one’s own. If a user who has not 
revealed his innovation adopts the manufacturer-improved product (which builds upon 
his competitor’s innovation), we assume that the user’s own innovation does not convey 
any additional benefits. This is a sensible assumption since, apart from their 
idiosyncrasies, the users’ innovations are substitutes (and the revealing user’s 
idiosyncrasy is built into the product). 
If only user 1 has revealed, then adopting the manufacturer-improved product 
pays for him if  
 ∆ − c   >   δ      ⇔      µ   >   c/δ  . (3) 
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For the non-revealing user 2, adopting the innovation of user 1 is profitable if 
 γ∆ − c   >   δ      ⇔      γ(1+µ) − 1   >   c/δ  . (4) 
Note that both conditions are independent of the respective competitor’s action: 
the game has dominant strategies. Inequality (4) is stronger than (3). This means that 
three cases can be distinguished: if (4) is satisfied, then both users adopt the improved 
product. If inequality (3) holds, but not (4), then only user 1 (who had revealed his 
innovation) would adopt. This makes sense, since, due to specificity to user 1’s needs, 
user 1 derives a higher utility from the improved product than user 2. If also (3) is 
violated, then the cost of adoption is too high even for user 1. 
If both have revealed, then the manufacturer has to choose one version of the 
innovation to be implemented in his improved product. We do not model this choice in 
detail, but simply assume that the payoffs are now given by γM∆−α γM∆ for both firms, 
where γ ≤γM≤1. This inequality would be consistent with a random choice by the 
manufacturer which leaves the expected payoff to both users somewhere in between the 
benefit of the single innovative user after revelation and the non-innovator after 
adoption. It can also be interpreted as a conscious choice by a manufacturer which – by 
inspection of two alternative innovations – gains some insight into how to combine 
design features. This leads us to a symmetric final-stage payoff matrix (Figure 3, right-
hand panel), where the condition for adoption of the innovation is the same for both 
players:  
 γM∆ − c   >   δ      ⇔      γM(1+µ) − 1   >   c/δ  . (5) 
Since γ≤γM≤1, the three conditions (3) to (5) lead us to distinguish four different 
cases, as illustrated in Figure 4.  
Include Figure 4 about here 
If we assume that incorporating the revealed innovation(s) into a product only 
pays for the manufacturer if both users adopt the improved product, then of the four 
cases (i) to (iv), only (i) and (ii) matter: in case (iii), only the revealing innovator (in 
case only one of them reveals) would adopt, and in case (iv) no-one would adopt.  
Using the subgame payoff matrices depicted in Figure 3, one can construct 
reduced payoff matrices for the users’ simultaneous decisions to reveal or not. These are 
shown in Figure 5. 
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Include Figure 5 about here  
In case (i), that is, with low cost of adoption, revealing by both user-innovators is 
always an equilibrium, since  
 γM∆(1−α) − c   >   γ∆ − α∆ − c      ⇔      γM − γMα   >   γ − α   (6) 
and γ≤γM≤1.  
There may exist a second equilibrium in which none of the innovators reveals. 
The condition for this equilibrium to exist is 
 δ − αδ   >   ∆ − αγ∆ − c      ⇔      γ   <   (α+µ−c/δ) / (α(1+µ))  .   (7) 
In case (ii), “not reveal” by both users is obviously an (indifferent) equilibrium. 
Revelation by both users is an equilibrium if  
 γM∆(1−α) − c   >   δ − αδ      ⇔      (γM(1+µ) − 1) (1−α)   >   c/δ  . (8) 
This condition is stronger than condition (5), which defines the upper limit for c/δ 
in case (ii). Depending on the values of α, γ and γM, there may or may not be values of 
c/δ in the range of case (ii) which fulfill inequality (8).  
Figure 6 illustrates the case of two innovators. The chosen parameter 
combinations of µ and c/δ are the same as in Figure 2. In order to simplify the 
presentation, we have set γM=(1+γ)/2. However, other values of γM (satisfying γ≤γM≤1) 
would yield qualitatively the same picture. 
Include Figure 6 about here 
The upper area in each graph, the full gray rectangle (areas A, B, C in graph a)11, 
corresponds to case (i). That is, inequality (4) is fulfilled, and revealing (followed by 
adoption) by both user-innovators is an equilibrium. “Not revealing” by both innovators 
is another equilibrium above the downward sloping curve (C in graph a), but not below 
it (A, B). The broken line separating A and B is defined by inequality (8). While (8) has 
been derived for case (ii) (areas D and E in graph a), it has a very interesting 
interpretation also in case (i): above the line (area A), the unique equilibrium 
                                                 
11  The same areas A to F, although shifted and deformed, can be identified in all other graphs b) to f), 
except for area F in graphs d) and e) 
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“revealing” by both is preferred to the alternative symmetric situation “not revealing”. 
In area B, on the other hand, the user-innovators would do collectively better by not 
revealing, but a prisoner’s dilemma does lead them to reveal. The interpretation is 
insightful: due to higher competition compared to area A, the gains from using the 
improved product are largely competed away, and the cost c of adoption further reduces 
the players’ payoffs. However, if only one user-innovator were to reveal, then the other 
would still find it preferable to adopt. Doing so, he prevents his competitor from 
attaining too much of an advantage. But, given that he will adopt even in that case, he 
does better by also revealing, since then the manufacturer-improved product fits his 
idiosyncratic needs just as well as those of his competitor.  
In area C, again the two players’ payoffs are higher if no-one reveals than if both 
reveal. However, in C, “no-one reveals” is also an equilibrium, such that the prisoner’s 
dilemma situation from B has turned into a coordination problem. The intuition behind 
this is that with increasing generality of the innovations (higher γ) and increasing 
competition (higher α), the relative gains from being the only one to reveal diminish, 
which turns “no-one reveals” into a stable situation. 
The rectangle below, which fills the whole rest of the parameter space in graphs d) 
and e), corresponds to case (ii), where inequality (5) holds. Here, revealing by both 
users is an equilibrium above the upward sloping curve (area D in graph a). In this 
equilibrium, both innovators do better than in any other combination of strategies 
(which invariably yield the payoff δ−αδ for both, since in case (ii) no innovation is built 
into a product if only one user adopts). As we would expect, this equilibrium disappears 
for high degrees of competition (high α) and low generality of the innovations (small γ), 
since both effects decrease the relative gains of revealing compared to secrecy.  
In the whole rectangle (D, E), as well as in the space below (F), “no-one reveals” 
is also an equilibrium. More precisely, it is an indifferent equilibrium: if no-one reveals, 
there is no point in a unilateral deviation because the other user would not adopt the 
improved product – due to higher idiosyncrasy (lower γ) compared to case (i), it would 
be too specific to his competitor’s needs. This induces the manufacturer not to build it in 
the first place, such that a revelation by only one innovator would be without effect. In 
real life, this equilibrium should even be a stable situation, not just indifferent, since 
there will be some level of cost connected with revealing. Note that the equilibrium “no-
one reveals” in areas D, E, and F is of a different nature than the corresponding one in 
area C. In C, being the only one to reveal does lead the manufacturer to incorporate the 
innovation, and the competitor to adopt it. However, due to high competition and low 
idiosyncrasy, this is disadvantageous to the revealing innovator.  
Comparing graphs a) to f) illustrates the influence of the manufacturer’s 
improvement (µ) and the relative cost (c/δ) of adopting the improved product. The more 
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pronounced the manufacturer’s value addition, the more attractive revealing becomes. 
When, as in graph c), this value addition is more modest (µ=1) and the relative cost of 
adopting is high (c/δ=3/4), then revealing only happens if the innovations’ generality is 
very high. On the other hand, when the manufacturer makes considerable improvements 
and the cost of adoption is relatively low (graph d, µ=2 and c/δ=1/4), then free revealing 
occurs for almost all parameter combinations (α,γ): only in extreme cases of strong 
competition and high idiosyncrasy (white area bottom right) innovators prefer to keep 
secrecy. Finally, consider the situations where revealing by both is an equilibrium, but 
one which is inferior to “no-one reveals” (areas B, C). For extensive manufacturer 
improvements µ and low adoption cost c/δ (graph d), these situations are restricted to 
cases of strong competition and medium to high generality. On the other extreme, if µ is 
low and c/δ is high (graph c), then “inefficient revealing” (from the point of view of the 
innovators) only occurs for high generality, for all but the lowest levels of competition. 
4 Discussion 
Innovation is often a process to which several actors with complementary 
capabilities contribute. Creating the conditions for these actors to engage jointly in 
innovation processes is often welfare-improving, since none of them has sufficient 
knowledge or information to produce the innovation on their own.  Conversely, factors 
that prevent actors from participating in these processes would tend to reduce social 
welfare. The usual candidates for factors having such effects are transactions costs, 
informational asymmetries and the incompleteness of contracts. Taken alone or 
together, they may prevent economic agents from coming to the division of labor that 
allows each actor to most effectively contribute to the development of innovations.  
Moreover, the classical view includes the assumption that any uncompensated 
information transfer that occurs in such a system must be involuntary – knowledge 
spills out in this case, to the detriment of the party losing it to competitors or others, 
since each agent seeks to keep its information proprietary in order to reap the maximum 
possible return on it. The conventional prescription is often to strengthen the property 
rights that innovators can obtain.  
We think that this view is limited, and that it may actually misrepresent a large 
number of real-world cases. We agree to the notion that important forces introduce 
friction, and that the market for intellectual property is imperfect. Our assumption that 
licensing is not feasible, and that there are no side payments between users and between 
innovator users and manufacturers reflects this view. But this strong assumption does 
not imply that there will be no information transfer. First, we have pointed out that 
information transfers which are not accompanied by monetary compensation are 
frequent. Moreover, they occur intentionally – hence, they can be called voluntary 
information spillovers.  
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Our paper has sought to contribute to the reconciliation of this actual economic 
behavior with economic theory. We developed a simplified game-theoretic model 
describing the interplay of incentives related to the decision to freely reveal for various 
intensities of rivalry in the marketplace.  The incentives described in the model 
developed in section 3 have a good fit with the real-world conditions faced by user-
innovators in the copper-interconnections, clinical chemistry analyzers, OPACs, and 
open source software innovations described in section 2.  In each of these cases, 
innovations freely revealed by users were adopted by manufacturers who then made 
them available to all users via commercial sale.  (Recall that, in the case of user 
innovations developed for open-source software products, the functional equivalent of 
the manufacturer is the volunteer user group having, by established custom, the 
exclusive right to add innovations to the “official” version of that product (Raymond 
1999).)   
Our model identifies a range of conditions under which users could be expected to 
benefit from freely revealing their innovations to others via manufacturers.  Thus we 
propose that, in a world of self-interested agents with complementary capabilities, free 
revealing can be profitable.  We further reason that free-revealing by innovating users is 
likely to be a common phenomenon.  Consider that, for any area of innovation 
application, there are likely to be a number of users extant with relevant and valuable 
information, and who are experiencing different conditions with respect to the 
desirability of revealing that information.  Note that all that is required for information 
diffusion to occur is that at least one such user be in a position to benefit sufficiently 
from openly revealing his version of the innovation-related information.   
The model we have discussed in this paper does not directly address the 
possibility of direct user-to-user transfer without any involvement by a manufacturer or 
functional equivalent. However, direct user-to-user transfer does often occur, as has 
been documented in the case of process innovations in iron and steel (Allen 1983, von 
Hippel 1987, Schrader 1991).  Our model is applicable to user-to-user transfers in which 
the receiving user creates an externality enjoyed by the sender.  In this case, the 
parameter µ in our model can be interpreted as the size of the externality while the 
interpretation of the other parameters does not change. (Allen proposed that free 
revealing can be profitable for an innovating user when a revealed innovation is specific 
to an asset held by that innovator, and when revealing raises the value of that asset 
enough to offset the loss of profits associated with the revelation.)  For simplicity, our 
model assumed a symmetric duopoly. The introduction of (moderate) asymmetry will 
leave our results qualitatively unchanged, for reasons of continuity. The oligopoly case 
will also retain the main features of our model, certainly as long as the number of firms 
is sufficiently small.  
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Our work points to an interesting and possibly major problem in the empirical 
assessment of knowledge flows. In an illuminating survey of the spillover literature, 
Griliches (1994) has already provided a cautious view of the advances made in this 
field. With few exceptions, authors in the area of spillover measurement interpret the 
measured impact of “knowledge pools” on R&D expenditures or output as the impact of 
unintended knowledge flows. In the usual interpretation, therefore, these measures give 
us an idea of the importance of knowledge externalities.12 In contrast, our data and 
model suggest that the interpretation of spillover coefficients may not only measure the 
externality originating from unintended spillover flows, but also the impact of 
information that has been revealed intentionally. If the phenomenon of free-revealing of 
innovations by users is indeed interesting and important, then it will be valuable to 
extend and improve the model of the phenomenon that we have presented here, and to 
develop other types of models as well.  
Finally, our argument that many users will have an incentive to freely diffuse 
information about their innovations makes measures to encourage and utilize 
innovations developed by users an attractive proposition from the viewpoint of the 
overall economy. If innovating users generally were not willing to freely reveal their 
innovations, then general diffusion could not occur unless either many users 
independently developed similar innovations, or a manufacturer either developed or 
licensed a similar innovation and offered it for general sale in the marketplace.  Under 
such conditions it would clearly be more economical to encourage licensing by users 
and/or innovation by manufacturers – thus avoiding the cost of multiple independent 
innovations by users. Promoting the development, free revealing, and widespread 
utilization of user innovations may often be in the best interest of profit-seeking user-
innovators, and welfare-improving as well.  
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Figure 1 
Decision tree when only user 1 is an innovator 
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Figure 2 
Conditions for free revealing in (a,γ) parameter space when only user 1 is an innovator 
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Figure 3 
Payoff matrix in the final stage subgame when both users are innovators 
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Figure 4 
Adoption decisions as a function of c/δ when both users are innovators 
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Figure 5 
Profit matrix of the reduced game when both users are innovators 
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 Figure 6 
Conditions for free revealing in (a,γ) parameter space when both users are innovators 
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